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1. Introduction 
When introduced in models on economic growth, natural resources are 
commonly treated as input in the production of final goods. Renewable resources are, 
for example, either treated as a constant flow, where it is assumed that the resource is 
being harvested at its maximum sustainable yield or some other constant rate that has 
been solved for or determined before the growth problem is solved (Solow (1999), 
Sachs and Warner (1995)), or the rate of harvest is treated as a choice variable that 
can be determined without use of other inputs (Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991), Li 
and Löfgren (2000)).  
A defining characteristic of many renewable resources is that they are unable to 
grow without bounds. There is some natural limit to their size in nature, often referred 
to as the carrying capacity of the environment. This feature, combined with the fact 
that the resource stock is a form of capital, precludes the attainment of a balanced 
growth path. Long run equilibrium solutions of growth models with renewable 
resources are therefore usually steady state solutions. To put it differently, the 
equilibrium growth rate is zero (see e.g. AK model in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 
5), Rodríguez and Sachs (1999), Herbertsson (1999, ch. 6)). There are, however, a 
few exceptions. 
Examples of models where a renewable resource is used in production, and an 
equilibrium solution is charcterized by a balanced growth path are, for instance, given 
by Bovenberg and Smulders (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998, Schumpetrian 
model in ch. 5). The renewable resource in the Bovenberg and Smulders model as 
well as in the Aghion and Howitt model is environmental quality; and while the 
assumptions that drive sustainable growth may be appropriate in those circumstances, 
they are perhaps less so when applied to typical resources such as forests or fisheries  2      
(see Elíasson (2001) for further discussion). 
In a recent paper Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004) solve an endogenous growth 
model with a renewable resource sector, and show sufficient conditions for the 
existence of a balanced growth path for the economy, along which the resource sector 
is in a steady state equilibrium. This happens despite the resource sector, which 
produces fish for export, and the non-traded sector, which drives long run growth in 
the model, both using labour from a common stock. The distribution of labour along 
the steady state – balanced growth path is determined endogenously in the model.  
This paper studies a more disaggregated open access version of the Elíasson and 
Turnovsky model, which allows for inefficient over exploitation and introduces a 
potential welfare improving role for the government.  
Section 2 sets out the structure of the model, describing the behaviour in different 
sectors of the economy. Section 3 describes the macroeconomic equilibrium, and the 
equilibrium concept in this model is further discussed in section 4. Policy instruments 
and their equilibrium effects are introduced in section 5, followed by policy 
implications in section 6. Section 7 introduces the Icelandic economy between 1950 
and 1975 as a case study. Section 8 concludes.  
2. Structure of the economy 
The economy consists of households, two types of firms, and a government. The 
households maximize their utility, given a budget constraint. They have demand for 
consumption of the domestically produced (growth sector) good Y, and the imported 
good Z. The households’ earnings come from supplying labour L, and renting capital 
K, to firms. 
Firms in the growth sector maximize profits. There are many identical firms, 
which produce their output using capital and labour. The output Y is either consumed  3      
by the households CY, or used to increase the existing stock of capital. The total 
amount of capital in the economy increases productivity, but this is not taken into 
account by an individual firm because its own contribution to the total capital stock is 
negligible. In other words, there are positive production externalities associated with 
capital. 
The harvest X from the resource sector is exchanged abroad for a consumption 
good, at a fixed world price p. The consumption good is then sold to the households in 
the home market. The relative price of the imported good and the non traded good 
(from the growth sector) is determined endogenously. Each fisherman ignores the 
externality he imposes on others, i.e. the fact that whatever he harvests of the resource 
will no longer be available to others. Hence there are negative externalities associated 
with the harvest effort. 
The government can use three different instruments to achieve its goals. The 
instruments are income tax, tariff, and harvest fee. Possible goals are e.g. increasing 
efficiency, maximizing welfare, or ensuring sustainability. The government is not 
assumed to provide any services. It simply refunds the tax in a lump sum manner to 
the households. 
2.1. Optimization by households 
The households choose the level of consumption of the domestically produced 
good CY, consumption of the imported good CZ, supply of labour to the growth sector 
LY, supply of labour to the resource sector LX, and the rate of investment K &  to 
maximize the intertemporal utility function 
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subject to the budget constraint 
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and the labor allocation constraint 
  Y X L L + = 1  (3) 
where τ T, τ I are tariff and income tax, respectively, T is the lump-sum rebate, q is the 
relative price of imports in terms of the domestically produced good (net of the tariff), 
w and ψ  are the wage and rental rates, respectively, ρ  is the discount factor and φ  is 
between 0 and 1 and represents the relative importance of the imported good in 
consumption.
1 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution ε  is related to γ  by ε  = 1/(1 
– γ ).  
2.2. Growth sector firms 
There is a large number, N say, of small identical firms, producing the domestic 
output Y which is used for consumption CY and investment  . K &  Each firm has the 
production function 
  ()
α α − =
1
i i i KL AK Y  (4a) 
where i ∈  [1,N] identifies the firm. Each firm takes the total amount of capital K as 
given, because its own actions have only negligible effects on the aggregate stock of 
capital. However, productivity of labour increases with the aggregate stock of capital. 
Following Romer (1986) the use of the aggregate capital stock as a productivity index 
is justified by assuming that knowledge is proportional to capital. Total output in the 
growth sector is 
                                                 
1 The utility function (1) is equivalent to the logarithmic utility function if γ  = 0, i.e. 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) γ
φ
γ
φ 1 lim log
0 − =




Y AKL Y  (4b) 
Each growth sector firm maximizes, at each instant, its profit function 
  () i i Y i i i K L w KL AK ψ
α α − − = Π
− 1  (5) 
2.3. Resource sector 
There is free access to the resource, so labour will enter fishing as long as the 
benefits exceed the costs. In this sense the fishing industry can be thought of as 
consisting of a continuum of infinitesimal firms; each hiring labour in order to 
maximize its profit function given per unit catch value and labour cost. Effort is 
measured by labour which is the only input, and decreasing returns to effort are 
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The industry is earning profits  
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where q/p is the value of catch in terms of domestic output and m is the harvest fee.
3 
2.4. Government 
The government achieves its goals by levying taxes on income and imports, in 
addition to charging fees for harvest. The tax revenues are redistributed as a lump-
sum payment T at each instant. The government runs a continuously balanced budget, 
as given by its budget constraint 
                                                 
2This function is a usable approximation for harvest from a stock that keeps its density constant, such 
that the rate of harvest does not depend on the stock size The Schaefer harvest function is discussed in 
Appendix B. See e.g. Hannesson (1993) for a discussion of these and alternative forms of the harvest 
function.  
3 p is the price of imports in terms of exports, and q is the price of imports in terms of the domestic 
good. These relative prices are taken as given by the individual firm.  6      
  () mX qC K L w L w T Z T Y Y X X I + + + + = τ ψ τ  (8) 
The government’s budget constraint can actually be derived by subtracting the 
household’s budget constraint (2) from the economy wide resource constraint 
  Z Y qC C X
p
q
Y K − − + = &  (9) 
which simply states that whatever is left of total output after consumption, is added to 
the stock of capital. p is the fixed world price of imports in terms of exports, i.e. p
–1 is 
the terms of trade. Since only the resource good is traded this can further be simplified 
to 
  Y C Y K − = &  (9a) 
  X pCZ =  (9b) 
i.e. output of the growth sector is used for consumption and investment, while output 
of the resource sector is exchanged for imports at the rate p. There is no mechanism 
for borrowing in this model so the economy runs a continuously balanced trade. 
Furthermore, there is only one traded good, the resource good, and therefore the value 
of imports must at each instant equal the value of the resource good. 
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which it takes into account when choosing its policy.  
3. Macroeconomic equilibrium  
The economy will be characterized by a ‘perfect foresight equilibrium’, i.e. 
planned output and labour equal the real supplies, and all anticipated variables are 
correctly forecast (Turnovsky (2000)). Taking the first order conditions from the  7      
intertemporal utility maximization of the households together with the demand 
functions for capital and labour that are derived from maximization of profits in the 
growth sector together with the free access assumption in the resource sector, the 
governments budget constraint (8), and the resource constraint (10), we have a 
description of the optimality conditions for the economy. Assuming an interior 
solution for the labour shares we have the equilibrium wage rate  Y X w w w = ≡  and the 
first order conditions for the decentralized open access economy are (in addition to the 
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The first two equations (11a) and (11b) result from the households’ maximization 
problem. They equate the marginal utility of consumption of the two goods (measured 
in terms of the non-traded good) to the shadow value of capital. Growth sector firms 
hire labour until its marginal product equals the wage rate in the growth sector (left 
hand side of equation (11c)).
5 Under the open access assumption, effort in the 
resource industry will increase until the marginal profit is zero, yielding the right hand 
side of (11c), which is equal to the wage rate in the resource sector. Households 
supply labour to the sector paying a higher wage rate. If the wage rates in both sectors 
are equal the labour allocation is determined by equation (11c). Equation (11d) 
                                                 
4 The first order conditions (11) are derived in Appendix A. 
5 See the profit function (6).  8      
equates the rate of return to investing in capital to the rate of return on consumption, 
measured in terms of the non-traded good. 
The growth rate of the consumption to capital ratio in the growth sector (defined 
as  K C c Y / ≡ ) is 
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Taking the time derivative of the first order condition (11c) and solving for the 





















α  (13) 
where, for convenience, it is assumed that the resource use fee is set proportional to 




m υ =  (14) 
(where  υ  is a constant between 0 and 1). This is a reasonable assumption. If the 
government sees a reason to increase costs in the resource sector by imposing a 
harvest fee, then this is an attractive method, because here the resource firms earn 
their income by selling the imported good in the home market at the price q, while the 
amount of imports is proportional to the harvest. The harvest fee is thus a fraction of 
the total value of the catch.  
With perfect property rights the resource stock plays the role of a sluggish 
variable in addition to the capital stock, thus generating stable transitional dynamics in 
the model (see Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004)). Here, on the other hand, equations 
(12) and (13) are linearly dependent, so the dynamic system has collapsed to a single 
dynamic equation in c. The resource constraint (10) is completely ignored by the  9      
agents studied so far, i.e. household, growth and resource sectors.
6  
4. Steady state/balanced growth path 
Steady state in the resource sector is characterized by three possibilities. That is 
1) the resource sector disappears,
7 either because the resource is not harvested, and it 
therefore reaches its natural steady state level (the carrying capacity), or 2) it is 
completely depleted, or 3) the harvest will be at a constant rate, and equal to the own 
growth rate of the stock at the steady state level. In other words  0 = X L &  must hold in 
steady state. 
On a balanced growth path, with a constant labour share in the resource sector, 
the capital stock is growing at a constant rate, as long as the consumption to capital 
ratio is constant, i.e. 
  c AL
K
K




Hence the capital stock and the rate of consumption are growing at the same rate. 
Therefore the growth rate of c is zero, i.e.  
  0 = c &  (15) 
Together equations (12), (13) and (10) give the growth rates of the consumption 
to capital ratio in the growth sector, the share of labour in the growth sector, and the 
resource stock, as functions of these three variables, the government’s policy 
instruments and the parameters. As stated above the decentralized economy ignores 
the resource constraint (10) and the dynamics (12) and (13) collapse to a single 
equation. Given that labour is used by both sectors, the labour shares, consumption to 
capital ratio, and growth rate of the non-traded sector will therefore stay at their 
                                                 
6 Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004) discuss the open acces case briefly (see section 4.3. in their paper). 
7 This requires the parameter φ  = 0 in the utility function (1), indicating that the imported good has zero 
weight in the case of a closed economy.    10      
equilibrium values, and the system has no transitional dynamics. The equilibrium 
value of employment in the resource sector will in turn determine the harvest rate. 
Whether the resource sector will attain an equilibrium rate of harvest depends on the 
equilibrium labour share and the initial size of the resource stock S. If the rate of 
harvest is too high the resource will be depleted.  
Given the nature of the harvest function (6), the stable equilibrium under free 
access (if one exists) is here to the right of the maximum sustainable yield level 
(SMSY). For that to be the case total cost must be rising faster than net revenues as a 
function of effort at the point where they are equal, and this has to correspond to an 
effort level that is less than needed to harvest at the maximum sustainable rate (known 
as maximum sustainable yield or MSY). This condition can in principle be compared 
to the value of the labor share determined by the balanced growth path to find if such 
a steady state exists. 
If conditions for an interior solution for the labor shares are satisfied, then the 
economy jumps straight to the equilibrium characterized by the steady state harvest 
rate and the balanced growth determined by the constant ratio c. If the steady 
state/balanced growth path exists, it may not be sustainable. If the harvest rate is high 
enough, the resource will be depleted completely. Even if the harvest rate is low 
enough for sustainability of the resource stock at a particular level, it may be that the 
stock was too small to begin with to cope. So even if the dynamics are redundant we 
can not simply claim that the economy will jump straight to the steady state. It may 
not jump to an equilibrium at all, and even if it jumps to one, that equilibrium may not 
be stable—it may lead to extinction of the resource stock. 
The resource sector employment in the decentralized economy under the open 
access assumption is, other things equal, greater than if the resource dynamics are  11      
taken into account by the harvesting firms, such as would happen if perfect property 
rights are assumed. Further, resource sector employment may be too high, such that it 
drives the resource stock to extinction. If it is low enough to be sustainable, then it is 
associated with a stock level that is higher than it would be in the case of perfect 
property rights (see Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004) for a detailed discussion about the 
case of perfect property rights). 
5. Policy tools and steady state effects 
The government has three instruments, the income tax τ I, the import tariff τ T, and 
the harvest fee ratio ν
8, that it can use to affect the economic equilibrium. The steady 
state effects of an increase in the policy instruments are summarized in table 1.  
Table 1. Steady state effects of an increase in policy instruments. There are separate 
columns for small steady state stock levels (smaller than the maximum sustainable yield 
level) and large steady state stock levels. The last column shows the effect on the growth 
rate of consumption and capital on the balanced growth path. 
Instrument  X L
~
  c ~   S
~
S   L
~
S   ξ ξ ξ ξ      
τ I  + +/–  +    – – 
τ T  – + – + + 
ν  – + – + + 
 
Increasing the income tax causes the effort level in the resource sector to rise. This 
has a negative effect on the consumption to capital ratio, because of decreased 
employment in the (capital producing) growth sector. This negative effect on the 
                                                 
8 Recall that the harvest fee m is proportional to the relative price of the value of the catch to the 
domestic good, i.e. m = ν(q/p).  12      
consumption to capital ratio in steady state is (at least partially) offset by the effect of 
substitution out of investment and into consumption (because decreased employment 
in the growth sector results in a lower return to capital).  
The effect on the steady state resource stock depends on whether it is above or 
below SMSY. If it is small then an increase in the income tax will result in a larger 
equilibrium resource stock, but if it is large, then the steady state stock will move in 
opposite direction to the income tax rate. An increase in the income tax will 
unambiguously lower the equilibrium growth rate. In an open access equilibrium the 
L S
~
 column is the relevant one while  S S
~
 applies in a perfect property rights model (i.e. 
where the resource dynamics are taken into account by the optimizing agents). 
Qualitatively the tariff and the harvest fee have identical effects on the 
equilibrium variables. This is because the harvest, and only the harvest, is traded for 
the imported consumption good. Therefore an increase in the price of the imported 
good (tariff) has the same qualitative effects as a decrease in the net revenues in the 
fishing sector (harvest fee). Increasing the value of either of these instruments lowers 
the return to fishing in terms of utility gained by consuming the imported good. It 
therefore reduces employment in the resource sector, increases it in the growth sector 
and thus adds to the growth rate. Again, the effects on the equilibrium stock of the 
resource depend on whether the equilibrium value is above or below the MSY level. If 
it is below, then a higher tariff or harvest fee results in a lower equilibrium stock 
level. If the equilibrium stock is above SMSY then it will rise following an increase in 
the tariff or harvest fee. 
6. Implications for policies 
Comparing the decentralized open access solution to the first best equilibrium,  13      
reveals the feasible policy options there are for copying the first best. The steady 
state/balanced growth equilibrium in the centrally planned economy is derived from 
the following first order conditions:  
  [] λ
γφ β γ =
− − − 1 1 1
X Y BL p C  (16a) 
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where µ is the shadow value of the resource (valued in terms of the non-traded good 
Y). In addition the transversality conditions 
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must hold. Macroeconomic equilibrium in the decentralized economy was derived 
from the first order conditions (11). In equation (16a) the balanced trade condition 
(9b) and the harvest function (6) have been substituted in for consumption of the 
imported good. Otherwise equation (16a) is identical to (11a). There are, however, a 
few differences in the first order conditions.  
The return to labour in the resource sector has two terms in the central planners 
solution. First it affects utility, since a larger harvest means more consumption of the 
imported good and less of the domestic good. Second, the central planner recognizes 
the shadow value of the resource stock, because the resource dynamics are taken into 
account.   14      
The central planner also internalizes the externality caused by the aggregate 
capital stock in the production function in the non-traded sector (hence the α  is 
missing from equation (16c) (as compared to (11d))). The central planner recognizes 
the role of the aggregate capital stock as a proxy for knowledge and therefore 
allocates more labor to the growth sector than in the decentralized case. 
6.1. Growth enhancing policies 
The growth rate of the economy can be increased by raising the import tariff, 
increasing the harvest fee, or lowering the income tax. From (11b) we see that 
increasing the tariff, or raising the harvest fee, will lower the observed return to labour 
in the resource sector. This leads to a substitution of labour from the resource sector to 
the growth sector, thus increasing the rate of growth. From (11d) a decrease in the 
income tax rate will increase the return to capital, leading to a shift from consumption 
to investment, increasing the growth rate. All these policies will lower the rate of 
harvest. Whether the resource stock will increase or decrease as a result depends on 
whether it was being harvested at a sustainable rate or not; and if it was harvested too 
forcefully, then how small was the stock at the time that the policy was changed. 
From table 1 we see that given that an equilibrium exists at both the old and the new 
rate of harvest, then the relative size of the stock at the equilibrium depends on 
whether they are to the left or the right of the MSY stock size. This does not say 
anything about whether the change in policy would actually cause the stock size to 
move to the new equilibrium or not. There are four possibilities for the stock size at 
the time when a policy change caused the resource sector employment to fall. First, it 
could be at an equilibrium above SMSY. In this case, as the rate of harvest falls, the 
stock will grow until it reaches a new stable equilibrium to the right of the previous 
one. Second, it could be at an (unstable) equilibrium below SMSY. Here, the stock will  15      
also start growing, until it reaches the new stable equilibrium. Third, it could have 
been harvested at an unsustainable rate, and the stock size had fallen below the 
unstable equilibrium associated with the new rate of harvest. The new lower rate of 
harvest will still be too high at the current stock size, and the stock will be harvested 
to extinction. Finally, the stock could have been harvested at an unsustainable rate, 
but the stock size was above the unstable equilibrium associated with the new rate of 
harvest. Once again, the new harvest rate is smaller than the own growth of the 
resource under the new policy, and the stock will grow until it reaches the new stable 
equilibrium, above the SMSY. 
In case 3, the resource will eventually disappear. In cases 1, 2 and 4, the resource 
will reach a stable equilibrium under the new policy, where the stock size is above the 
maximum sustainable yield level. The new equilibrium will therefore be inconsistent 
with the resource sector transversality condition (16f). In fact the policy will increase 
the amount of the stock that sits there doing nothing but increasing in value (since the 
same harvest can be sustained at a lower stock level).
 9 
Maximizing the rate of growth implies that the income tax rate will be abolished, 
and the tariff or harvest fee will be prohibitive (such that LX = 0).
10 Discarding the 
resource sector is not consistent with the first best equilibrium solution found in the 
centrally planned economy. The reason is that although the harvest comes at the cost 
of lower growth, it does add to utility by increasing the variety in consumption. 
6.2. Ensuring sustainability 
The assumptions of cases 3 and 4 above imply that the resource sector was not 
                                                 
9 Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004) point out that if the harvest function is of the form X = BLX
1-β S then it 
is no longer apparent that the equilibrium value under perfect property rights (as would apply here in 
the centrally planned economy) is less than the MSY level.  
10 Note that in equilibrium the relative price of the imported good is rising at the growth rate of the 
domestic sector. Measured in units of the domestic good the economy is thus growing at the rate of 
output of the domestic sector.  16      
sustainable before the policy change. It follows from the discussion above that in 
order to ensure sustainability of the resource sector in equilibrium, it is necessary to 
raise the harvest fee or tariff sufficiently (or lower the income tax rate) for the harvest 
rate to drop below the own growth of the resource stock at the current level. As the 
resource stock grows, it is then possible to relax the instruments, allowing for an 
increased harvest rate, as long as the rate of harvest is kept no greater than the own 
growth of the resource stock. 
6.3. Replicating the first best 
Comparing the optimality conditions for the decentralized economy to the 
conditions for the first best optimum reveals that giving the policy variables the 








I  (17a) 
 0 = T τ  (17b) 
  µ = m  (17c) 
Equation (17a) implies a negative income tax, or a subsidy, and that a large one for 
plausible values of α .
11 This subsidy has to be funded by tariffs, harvest fee, or a 
direct transfer from the households (a negative T).  
Implementing these policies is, however, not sufficient to ensure that the 
economy will move to the first best equilibrium because the resource stock may be 
larger than the MSY level (and certainly so if a sustainable open access equilibrium 
had evolved), and hence its shadow value may not be following equation (16d). So 
even if the harvest rate has been lowered from its inefficiently high rate under free 
                                                 
11 E.g. if α  = 1/3, then τ T = – 2.  17      
access, the intertemporal inefficiency of the stock size has increased. We can 
therefore conclude that starting from a stable equilibrium under free access in the 
resource sector, the economy can only be moved to the first best optimum by first 
increasing the rate of harvest, in order to drive the stock size to its optimum level, and 
then decreasing it again, such that it exactly equals the own growth of the resource at 
the optimum (unstable) equilibrium. 
If the government was passive at the original free access equilibrium, then its 
only option in order to increase the employment level in the resource sector is to levy 
an income tax. Lowering a nonexistent import tariff or a zero harvest fee are clearly 
not options. Then, once the preferred stock size is reached, the income tax could be 
abolished, raising the growth rate. The government then has a choice of a tariff or 
harvest fee to keep the resource sector employment at the preferred level.  
The first best optimum is locally stable in the centrally planned economy, 
because the central planner takes the resource dynamics into account. It is unstable in 
the open access economy, because the private firms ignore the resource dynamics. It 
can only be stabilized through active government policy. 
7. Case study: The Icelandic economy between 1950 and 1975 
The model studied in this paper represents a simplified economy, where only a 
resource good, or harvest of a resource, can be traded for imports. This is a fair 
approximation to some economies; the Icelandic economy, particularly a few decades 
ago, being one example. 
Iceland is situated in the north Atlantic and is surrounded by bountiful fishing 
grounds. Until 1975 the main concern regarding fisheries was limiting the access of 
foreign fleets to Icelandic territories. Jurisdiction over the Icelandic fisheries was 
expanded in a few steps in the twentieth century. In 1952 Iceland’s territorial waters  18      
were expanded from 3 to 4 nautical miles (a process that began in 1950). In 1958 the 
fishing zone was further expanded to 12 miles, and to 50 miles in 1972. The final step 
was taken in 1975 when Icelandic jurisdiction was expanded to 200 miles, or midline 
from neighbouring countries if that was closer. From then onwards the emphasis has 
been on controlling the fisheries in order to ensure sustainability as well as high 
revenues. During the period from 1950 to 1975 the fisheries were more or less 
characterized by open access, while that description is less appropriate from then on. 
The following discussion will therefore focus on the period from 1950 to 1975. 
The model in this paper makes some strong assumptions about the fisheries 
sector. Two important ones are that: 1) all of the harvest from the fisheries is 
exported, and 2) the harvest from the fisheries is the only exported good. Domestic 
consumption of harvest from the fisheries in Iceland during the period from 1950 to 
































































Figure 1. Domestic consumption of fish as a percentage of Icelandic harvest (source: 
Jónsson and Magnússon (1997)). 
 
The domestic consumption is shown as a share of total catch caught by  19      
Icelanders. During the first half of the period other nations caught about as much fish 
in Icelandic waters as Icelanders. Consumption of fish as a fraction of total catch is 
therefore lower if catch by other nations is added (see fig. 2). It seems therefore to be 
more or less consistent with the data to assume that all of the harvest from the 
































































Figure 2. Total catch in Icelandic fisheries in thousands of tons (source: Jónsson and 
Magnússon (1997)). 
 
Figure 3 shows the share of fisheries in total exports and in goods exports. 
Exports of fisheries products is about or above 50% of total exports in the period and 
well above 70% of exported goods. In fact it is only in 1968, when the stock of 
herring had virtually been harvested to extinction, that the share of fisheries in 
exported goods falls significantly below 90%.
12 Although it is a great simplification to 
assume that harvest from the fisheries is the only export, it is still not an invalid 
assumption in this case, since it is clearly the single most important export throughout 
                                                 
12 After 1968 the share of fisheries in exports stays lower than before because of the growing share of 

































































Fisheries/Exported goods Fisheries/Exports  
Figure 3. Exports of fish and fisheries products as a portion of 1) total exports, and 2) 
exported goods (source: Jónsson and Magnússon (1997)). 
 
As already mentioned the main concern during this period was to gain full control 
over the fisheries, which clearly is a necessity for any policy action. The Icelandic 
fisheries were effectively an open access resource and as such subject to over fishing. 
Two suggestions follow from the model. The first is that in order to enforce 
sustainability the fishing effort has to be reduced, and that this can be attained by 
some form of a harvest fee or, equivalently, a tariff on imports. The second suggestion 
is that, in equilibrium, given a fixed world price of fish p
-1, and fixed size of the 
resource sector, the real exchange rate q
-1 must be falling at the rate of growth of the 
economy.  
The policy structure, regarding particularly tariffs and exchange rates, that 
evolved in Iceland during the open access period is complicated. In particular between 
1951 and 1959 a system of multiple exchange rates was in effect, and by 1958 about  21      
55% fee was added to most exchanges. This fee was used to subsidize exports; in 
particular the fishing industry. In addition considerable tariffs were levied on most 
imports. Some estimates amount to between 33% to 110% tariffs on protected 
industries. Jónsson (1975) suggests that in the context of a general tariff on imports 
the appropriate estimate lies around 25% in 1970. He concludes that protection of 
domestic industries through tariffs was in fact a form of a resource tax, since the bulk 
of exports originated in the fisheries sector.  
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Figure 4. Icelandic real exchange rate (source: Jónsson and Magnússon  (1997)). 
 
Some form of a fixed exchange rate was in effect most of the period from 1950 to 
1975. Despite steadily improving terms of trade throughout the period, where in 
particular the foreign price of fish was for the most part rising, in addition to 
increasing harvest (with the important exception of 1967 and 1968) the real exchange 
rate kept rising under the fixed exchange rate regime. This resulted in repeated 
devaluations of the Icelandic currency, in order to ensure profitability of the fishing  22      
industry (fig. 4, see Nordal and Tómasson (1985), and Jónsson (1975)).
13 
It has been suggested that this system may have developed as a means for 
controlling the effort in the fisheries sector, while at the same time redistributing the 
gains to the society (although it was not constructed with that intention) (see e.g. 
Jónsson (1975)).  
8. Conclusions  
The model studied here has two sectors. One is a Romer (1986) type growth 
sector, while the other is a typical open access renewable resource sector. This is 
therefore a growth model, and it is lacking a sluggish variable (in addition to the 
capital stock) in order to yield stable transitional dynamics. The model is thus always 
in equilibrium, and it simply jumps to a new equilibrium following a shock to the 
parameters. It is then left to chance whether the resource stock is approaching a stable 
equilibrium or whether it is being depleted. The resource dynamics are ignored by the 
agents in the model. Furthermore, if the resource sector attains a stable equilibrium it 
is bound to be an inefficient one, because the same rate of harvest can be sustained at 
a smaller resource stock. This may, however, follow from the form of the harvest 
function.  
If the open access economy is in an equilibrium with a stable resource stock, then 
an income tax could be used to move labour from the growth sector to the resource 
sector. This would temporarily further lower the growth rate, while simultaneously 
increasing the availability of imports. Upon reaching the desired stock size, the 
income tax could be relaxed, causing labour to move back from the resource to the 
growth sector. Under open access there is too much employment in the resource 
                                                 
13 The high exchange rate prior to 1960 in fig. 4 is somewhat exaggerated. In 1960 the nominal 
exchange rate was devalued by 57%, but only by about one third if the 55% fee on exchanges that was 
charged prior to this devaluation is accounted for.  23      
sector, so even more labour must be sent from the resource to the growth sector. This 
is achieved by either a harvest fee or a tariff on imports. 
The observation that qualitatively the effects of a tariff and a harvest fee are 
identical is a result of the setup of this model, following directly from the assumption 
that the harvest from the resource sector is the only exported good. Allowing other 
goods to be traded would change this. 
Despite its simplicity this model appears to relate in some aspects to the Icelandic 
economy in the 1950s and ‘60s. There, under open access to a fishery that was the 
source of the nation’s main export, a system of import tariffs and multiple exchange 
rates developed. It can be argued that this resulted, perhaps unintentionally though, in 
reduced effort in the fishery as well as redistributing the gains from the fisheries 
sector to the society. This system was then discarded, after the nation gained full 
control over the fishing grounds.   24      
Appendix A. Derivation of the first order conditions 
The households choose consumption of the domestic good CY, imported good CZ, 
labour allocation to each sector LX,  LY and rate of investment to maximize the 
Hamiltonian  
  () () ( ) () [] [ ] Y X Z T Y Y Y X X I Z Y L L C q C T K L w L w C C − − + + − − + + + − + 1 1 1
1
η τ ψ τ λ
γ
γ φ  
   (A1) 
which results in the first order conditions 
   λ
γφ γ =
−
Z Y C C
1  (A2a) 
  () T Z Y q C C τ λ φ
γφ γ + =
− 1
1  (A2b) 
  () η τ λ = − X I w 1  (A2c) 
  () η τ λ = − Y I w 1  (A2d) 
  () ψ τ ρ
λ
λ
I + − = 1
&
 (A2e) 
The growth sector firms hire labour and capital to maximize profits 
  () i i Y i i i K L w KL AK ψ
α α − − = Π
− 1  (A3) 
yielding the first order conditions 
  () Y i i w L K AK = −
− − α α α α
1 1  (A4a) 
  () ψ α
α α =
− − 1 1
i i KL AK  (A4b) 
Multiplying through (A4) by N
0 gives 
  () () ( ) Y i i w NL K NK A = −
− − α α α α
1 1   25      
  () ( ) ψ α
α α =
− − 1 1
i i KNL NK A   
which can be written as 
  () Y Y w AKL = −
− α α 1  (A4a’) 
  ψ α
α =
− 1
Y AL . (A4b’) 
Effort in the fishing industry is increased until the marginal profit from labour is 
zero, i.e.  










− β β 1  (A5) 
We are now ready to combine (A2), (A4’) and (A5) to form the first order conditions 
(11) given in the text. Equations (11a) and (11b) are simply the equations (A2a) and 
(A2b). Equations (11c) is found by equating (A2c) with (A2d), substituting in for the 
wage rates from (A4a’) and (A5). Finally, equation (11d) comes from plugging 
(A4b’) into (A2e).  26      
Appendix B. The Schaefer harvesting function 
The Schaefer harvesting function 
  S BL X X =  (B1) 
differs from the function (6) in the text in two ways. First, it assumes that there are 
constant returns to effort (labour) in harvesting (i.e. β  = 0). Second, it assumes that the 
harvest depends on the stock size S. Additional labour is attracted to fishing as long as 
the benefit from doing so is greater than the cost, i.e. as long as  









−  (B2) 
where increased effort has the effect of reducing the resource stock S. The fishing 
firms take the size of the stock S as given, and ignore the stock dynamics. It follows 
that, if the wage rate is neither too high nor too low, LX will increase until profits 










If the marginal cost of effort is sufficiently low, then the net revenue from additional 
labour will always be greater than the additional cost, and the resource sector will 
expand beyond the maximum sustainable yield level. The harvest will be larger than 
the own growth of the resource (at any stock level) and the resource stock will be 
driven to extinction. If the marginal cost is too high then no level of harvest will be 
profitable, and the harvest sector will not exist (while the resource stock is in 
equilibrium at the carrying capacity S ). In the case of a labor cost that is neither too 
low nor too high the effort would balance under free access where total cost equals 
total net revenues (see e.g. Hannesson (1993)). The first order condition determining 
labour use in the fishing sector (A5) is thus replaced by the zero profit condition  27      
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Restating the first order conditions (11) from the text, adding the new resource 
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1  (B4a) 
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The central planners (perfect property rights) solution (16) now becomes 
  [] λ
γφ γ =
− −
X Y BL p C
1 1  (B5a) 
  () BS L C AKL X Y Y µ φ α
α − = −
− − 1 1  (B5b) 
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Again, the first best solution can be replicated by appropriately choosing values 
for the policy parameters τ I, τ T and ν. The major change from equations (16) in the 
text is in the dynamics of the variable µ. See Elíasson and Turnovsky (2004) for a 
discussion of the dynamics and steady state solution in this case.  28      
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